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Understanding and Combating Investment Fraud
Abstract
Investment fraud is a significant problem in America. Estimates vary, but a conservative one is that about
10 percent of the investors will be victimized by investment fraud at some point in their lives. Further,
many baby boomers are entering retirement with significant assets, and enforcement actions by financial
regulators indicate that investors can be vulnerable to fraud at key ‘wealth events’ in their lives, such as
when they face a decision about what to do with money arising from the sale of a house, an inheritance,
or an IRA rollover. Protecting these assets—for baby boomers and younger generations who face key
wealth events—will be important to ensure the financial well-being and retirement security of millions of
Americans. This chapter reviews the dynamics of investment fraud victimization, explains how fraudsters
use social influence tactics to defraud their victims, and describes current investor protection efforts.
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Chapter 10
Understanding and Combating
Investment Fraud
Christine N. Kieffer and Gary R. Mottola

Despite the destructive toll that investment fraud can have on its victims,
researchers have only recently begun to understand the mechanics of fraud
and the characteristics of investment fraud victims. This chapter reviews
investment and ﬁnancial fraud victimization rates, examines the demographic and psychographic patterns associated with investment fraud victimization, explores the role of targeting in victimization, and explains how
fraudsters rely on social inﬂuence tactics to defraud their victims. We ﬁnd
that about one in ten investors will be victimized by investment fraud over
the course of their lives. Moreover, older people are targeted for investment
fraud more frequently than younger people, but after controlling for the
effects of targeting, older people are not more likely than younger people to
be victimized by investment fraud. We conclude with a discussion of what is
being done by consumer protection organizations and policymakers to
protect investors from investment fraud.1

The Prevalence and Impact of Fraud Victimization
Investment fraud is a subset of ﬁnancial fraud, and it occurs when someone
‘knowingly misleads an investor using false information for the purpose of
monetary gain’ (Beals et al. 2015). Investment fraud includes scams like
penny stock fraud, pre-IPO scams, oil and gas scams, Ponzi schemes, and
high-yield investment program fraud, to name a few. More generally, ﬁnancial fraud also includes other types of economic frauds, like lottery and
sweepstake scams, as well as scams involving worthless or non-existent products, and services such as bogus weight loss products or fake memorabilia.
Obtaining an accurate estimate of fraud prevalence—whether investment
fraud or ﬁnancial fraud—has been hindered by a number of factors. Estimates vary, sometimes widely, due to inconsistent deﬁnitions of fraud,
differences in the types of fraud examined, populations studied, underreporting of fraud, and the method used to measure fraud, such as law
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enforcement records or surveys (Deevy and Beals 2013). As such, fraud
prevalence estimates need to be considered in this context.
Although there are few estimates of investment fraud prevalence rates,
one is that about 7 percent of older investors will be victimized by investment
fraud at some point in their lives (Shadel et al. 2007). A calculation by the
authors based on data from a 2012 survey puts the estimate at 10 percent of
Americans age 40+ (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a). More
common are prevalence estimates of ﬁnancial fraud. Financial fraud prevalence rates as low as 4 percent and as high as 14 percent have been reported
(AARP 2003; Anderson 2007), and recent work by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) puts the estimated prevalence rate at 11 percent (Anderson
2013). These estimates are likely on the low side because fraud tends to be
underreported. Victims are often reluctant to report fraud because they
believe that reporting will make no difference, they are not sure where to
report the crime, or they are too embarrassed to do so (FINRA Investor
Education Foundation 2013a). From an international perspective, a study
by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
found that consumer fraud rates averaged 11 percent across twenty-nine
countries (Van Dijk et al. 2007).
Regardless of the varying prevalence rates, these and other studies
conclude that ﬁnancial fraud is a signiﬁcant and costly problem for Americans. For example, the Stanford Center on Longevity’s Financial Fraud
Research Center (FFRC) estimated that approximately $50 billion is lost
annually to consumer ﬁnancial fraud in the US (Deevy et al. 2012). And
the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority estimates that £1.2 billion is lost
annually to investment fraud, with an average loss of £20,000 per investor
(Graham 2014).
The full cost of ﬁnancial fraud can also extend far beyond the amount of
money lost. The $50 billion dollar ﬁgure noted above does not take into
account indirect costs like legal fees, late fees, and lost wages—and importantly, it does not consider the non-ﬁnancial costs of fraud, including stress,
anxiety, and depression. One study that examined the broader impact of
ﬁnancial fraud among Americans age 25+ found that nearly two-thirds of
self-reported ﬁnancial fraud victims experienced at least one non-ﬁnancial
cost of fraud to a serious degree, including anger, stress, and psychological
and emotional issues (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2015).
Beyond psychological and emotional costs, nearly half of fraud victims in
that study reported incurring indirect costs associated with the fraud such as
late fees, legal fees, and bounced checks. For example, 29 percent of
respondents reported more than $1,000 in indirect costs, and 9 percent
declared bankruptcy as a result of the fraud. A sobering insight from that
study is that nearly half of victims blamed themselves for the incident, an
indication of the far-reaching effects of ﬁnancial fraud on the lives of its
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victims. These non-traditional costs of fraud are not unique to the American
context: a study in the UK also found high levels of anger, stress, and
emotional issues among fraud victims (Button et al. 2014).
Beyond prevalence rates, another way to think about ﬁnancial victimization is to consider how many investors have assets at risk. Nearly seven in ten
households in America own investments either through taxable accounts or
retirement accounts like 401(k)s and various types of IRAs (Mottola 2015).
Accordingly, a broad swathe of the population has assets that are potentially
vulnerable to investment fraud. Moreover, even people without investment
accounts could fall prey to investment fraud if, for example, a fraudster
convinces them to pull equity out of their homes to use in a fraudulent
scheme. Further, many Baby Boomers are entering retirement with signiﬁcant assets (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Enforcement actions by ﬁnancial
regulators indicate that investors can be vulnerable to fraud at key ‘wealth
events’ in their lives, such as when they face a decision about what to do with
money arising from the sale of a house, an inheritance, or an IRA rollover
(FINRA 2015). Protecting these assets—for Boomers and younger generations who face key wealth events—will be important to ensuring the ﬁnancial
well-being and retirement security of millions of Americans.

The Demographics and Psychographics
of Victimization
As noted earlier, our understanding of fraud victimization prevalence rates
is hampered by a number of methodological and practical issues, and these
limitations apply to our understanding of how demographic and psychographic variables are related to fraud victimization. Yet a growing body of
research has provided important insights, including the notion that no
single stereotypical fraud victim proﬁle exists: that is, targets and victims of
ﬁnancial fraud vary by scam type. Early research has found that investment
fraud victims tend to be college-educated, ﬁnancially literate men who are
optimistic (Consumer Fraud Research Group 2006). Subsequent research
supports this proﬁle (AARP 2011; Graham 2014). This proﬁle may be
contrasted to that of lottery fraud victims, who are more typically single
older female consumers and those with lower levels of education and
income (Consumer Fraud Research Group 2006; AARP 2011).

Age and Fraud
Age is probably the most frequently researched demographic variable associated with fraud. There is a common belief that older people are more
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likely to be victims of ﬁnancial fraud, but stereotypes about victims are not
entirely supported by research.2 Certainly, some studies report that age and
fraud victimization are positively related. For example, one study found that
people age 50+ make up 35 percent of the population but 57 percent of
telemarketing fraud victims (AARP 1996). Another study found that Americans age 65+ were more likely to lose money to ﬁnancial fraud than those in
their 40s (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a). Also, some
researchers found that decreasing cognition associated with aging is predictive of future ﬁnancial fraud incidence (Gamble et al. 2014).
Nevertheless, other authors have reported the opposite: that is, as age
increases, fraud victimization decreases. The ﬁrst widely cited study on fraud
found that older consumers were three times less likely to be victims of
personal fraud than younger consumers (Titus et al. 1995). Two Federal
Trade Commission studies also showed that younger adults are more likely
to be victims of fraud (Anderson 2004, 2007). Another recent study reported
that the risk of fraud victimization decreased after age 50 (DeLiema 2015).
In addition, researchers surveyed ﬁndings from fourteen different studies,
and they concluded that there was no compelling evidence of a relationship
between age and consumer fraud victimization (Ross et al. 2014).
The confusion arises for several reasons. Perhaps most important, as
noted earlier, fraud proﬁles vary with the type of fraud, so research that
looks at the proﬁles of victims by grouping all fraud types together may
attenuate the relationship between age and fraud. Also, different conclusions may be reached depending upon the type of fraud examined. Moreover, some research suggests that older people are less likely to acknowledge
fraud (AARP 2011), which would obviously impact associations between
age and fraud. Results can also vary based on differences in the populations
studied.
Despite the empirical uncertainty about the relationship between age and
fraud, there is widespread belief that older people are more likely to be
victims of consumer fraud (Ross et al. 2014). Anecdotally, researchers have
pointed to the likelihood of seniors having more assets than younger adults,
consequently making them better fraud targets. In addition, researchers
have started to establish a link between cognitive changes associated with
aging and susceptibility to at least some forms of fraud. For example, several
researchers found that older people were more trusting of strangers’ faces,
and neurological evidence supports this association (Castle et al. 2012). This
higher level of trust could reduce the ability to recognize red ﬂags and lead
to greater engagement with fraudsters. Social isolation can play a role as
well. Increased isolation among the elderly may result in an older adult
being more open to engaging with strangers to fulﬁll unmet social needs
(Ganzini et al. 1990; Lee and Soberon-Ferrer 1997; Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2014).
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Other Demographic and Psychographic Variables
Beyond age, research also suggests that a number of demographic variables
are related to fraud victimization, although these ﬁndings are also mixed.
Sex, income, education, and marital status have all been associated with
fraud to varying degrees. Victims of investment fraud have higher incomes
and educational levels relative to victims of other ﬁnancial fraud crimes
(AARP 2011). They are also more likely to be married (Consumer Fraud
Research Group 2006; AARP 2011).
A number of psychographic variables have also been associated with fraud
victimization, among them, risk tolerance, perceptions of debt, impulsiveness, and ﬁnancial literacy. Speciﬁcally, higher levels of risk tolerance and
engagement in risky behaviors are associated with a higher probability of
fraud victimization (Van Wyk and Benson 1997; Schoepfer and Piquero
2009), as are higher levels of debt (Anderson 2004; Kerley and Copes
2002). Using multilevel data (i.e., fMRI, survey, and demographic), analysts
have compared investment fraud victims and non-victims, and they found
that victims reported higher impulsiveness and demonstrated less cognitive
ﬂexibility. They also showed less ventrolateral prefrontal cortical activity,
which is consistent with reduced impulse control (Knutson and SamanezLarkin 2014). Somewhat counter-intuitively, higher levels of ﬁnancial literacy have been associated with an increased probability of investment fraud
victimization (Consumer Fraud Research Group 2006; AARP 2007) and
consumer fraud victimization (AARP 2008).
What could account for this counter-intuitive relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and fraud? One explanation might be over-conﬁdence, a wellestablished bias in which a person tends to be more conﬁdent than correct;
in other words, over-conﬁdent individuals overestimate the accuracy of their
beliefs (Myers 1993). The idea that over-conﬁdence can affect ﬁnancial
decisions is not new. In an important study of stock trading behavior,
researchers found that over-conﬁdence was associated with higher levels of
trading and lower portfolio returns for online traders (Barber and Odean
2001). Other researchers also found that over-conﬁdence was a signiﬁcant
determinant of risky ﬁnancial behavior: over-conﬁdent individuals made
larger contributions in an investment game and were willing to take greater
investment risk (McCannon et al. 2015).
In some interesting analyses on whether over-conﬁdence was related to
fraud susceptibility, researchers found that over-conﬁdence was a risk factor
for ﬁnancial fraud victimization (Gamble et al. 2014). Yet the researchers
did not establish whether over-conﬁdence mediated the relationship
between ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnancial fraud. That is, it is possible that as
ﬁnancial literacy increases, feelings of over-conﬁdence rise as well. This
over-conﬁdence could yield feelings of invulnerability that, paradoxically,
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make respondents with high levels of ﬁnancial literacy more susceptible to
fraud. From this perspective, there is not a direct link between ﬁnancial
literacy and fraud susceptibility. Rather, over-conﬁdence may mediate the
relationship.
An inability to identify the ‘red ﬂags of fraud’ (i.e., responding positively
when presented with persuasion statements) provides another psychographic factor thought to be related to investment fraud victimization
(AARP 2011). People’s inability to identify the red ﬂags of fraud is usually
measured by showing marketing statements typically used by fraudsters
which are inconsistent with ethical investment advertisements. For example,
‘The lowest return you could possibly get on this investment is 50 percent
annually, but most investors are making upward of 110 percent per year’ is a
red ﬂag statement, as is ‘There is no way to lose money on this investment.’ If
the survey respondent rates these statements and others like them as
‘appealing’, they are considered less able to identify the red ﬂags of fraud.
The lack of understanding of reasonable investment returns (FINRA
Investor Education Foundation 2013a), and the desire for higher-thanaverage investment yields, leaves many Americans vulnerable to fraudulent
investment pitches.

The Role of Targeting in Investment
Fraud Victimization
While there is ample evidence that both demographic and psychographic
variables are related to ﬁnancial fraud victimization, another factor may also
help explain the likelihood of being victimized by fraud: the number of
times someone is targeted for fraud. For example, one demographic group
may have low levels of fraud victimization because it is not frequently
targeted; conversely, a group may have high levels of fraud victimization
because it is frequently targeted. In other words, examining the relationship
between age (or any demographic variable) and fraud victimization, without
controlling for how often a person is solicited for fraud, could result in
biased estimates of the relationship between key demographic variables and
fraud victimization.
To better understand investment fraud victimization, we use a regression
framework to examine, in particular, the relationship between age and
investment fraud victimization after controlling for a host of demographic
and psychographic variables and the likelihood of being targeted for investment fraud. We are able to conduct this analysis by combining two different
datasets. In 2012, the FINRA Investor Education Foundation commissioned
a study that examined the susceptibility of Americans to ﬁnancial fraud
(FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a). As part of this research,
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2,364 adults age 40+ completed an online survey via a non-probability based
Internet panel. The survey covered a wide range of measures of fraud
susceptibility and exposure to fraud. More than three-quarters of these
respondents were recruited from the panel that had completed the 2012
National Financial Capability Study earlier that year (FINRA Investor
Education Foundation 2013b). The two survey databases were combined
and the resulting dataset of 1,721 respondents aged 40 to 94 was weighted to
match the US Census distributions for both age (40 and over) and ethnicity.
Table 10.1 contains sample characteristics and the Appendix contains a
description of all the variables used in the regressions. As shown in
Table 10.1, the overall investment fraud victimization rate was 10 percent,
the average age was 57, 73 percent of the sample was targeted for at least one
type of investment fraud, and, on average, respondents received 1.8 solicitations (i.e., were targeted) for likely fraudulent investments.
Table 10.2 presents the results of a series of logistic regression models
predicting investment fraud. After controlling for demographic and psychographic variables, these results provide some insight into the role that
targeting plays in investment fraud victimization. The ﬁrst regression (column 1) contains only demographic variables, where age is strongly associated with investment fraud victimization. As indicated by the odds ratio
(OR), for every ten-year increase in age, the predicted odds of being an
investment fraud victim is 1.31 times higher. This statistically signiﬁcant
effect is equivalent to a 31 percent increase in the odds of being a victim
of investment fraud.3 Household income is also strongly and positively

TABLE . Sample characteristics for data analysis
Variable
Investment fraud victimization (dependent variable)
Targeted for at least one type of investment fraud
Household income > = $50,000
Male
College degree
White
Dependants
Widow/widower
Mean age
Mean ﬁnancial literacy questions answered correctly
Mean risk tolerance
Mean perceptions of debt
Mean inability to identify the red ﬂags of fraud
Mean number of targeted investment frauds

Statistic
10%
73%
46%
47%
31%
73%
29%
7%
57
3.1
4.3
3.8
5.9
1.8

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation’s
Fraud Susceptibility Study (2013) and the 2012 National Financial Capability Study.
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related to investment fraud victimization, as indicated by the highly signiﬁcant OR of 1.58, so the odds of investment fraud victimization for individuals
from households with $50,000+ in income were 58 percent higher than
individuals from households with less than $50,000 in income. The odds
of males being victimized by investment fraud are almost two times higher
than females (OR = 1.72), and the odds of college-educated respondents are
42 percent higher than their less educated counterparts (OR = 1.42). NonAsian minority status (i.e., black and Hispanic), marital status, presence of
dependants in the house, and being a widow/widower were not related to
investment fraud victimization.4
Column 2 in Table 10.2 adds psychographic variables into the equation
including ﬁnancial literacy, perception of debt, risk tolerance, and a measure of the inability of respondents to identify common red ﬂags of fraud.
These four variables are all signiﬁcantly and positively related to investment
fraud victimization. Including these psychographic variables eliminates the
relationship between household income and fraud victimization, as well as
gender and fraud victimization. Yet the age effect remains strongly related
to victimization.
The third column controls for investment fraud targeting by adding a
variable that is a count of investment fraud solicitations, and this variable is
highly related to fraud victimization. For each additional investment fraud
solicitation that a respondent receives, the odds of his victimization
increases by a factor of 1.84. In addition, the inclusion of this targeting
variable eliminates the signiﬁcance of all other demographic variables,
including age. However, risk tolerance, ﬁnancial literacy, and the inability
of the respondent to identify the red ﬂags of fraud remain statistically
signiﬁcant.5
It is not our intention, however, to suggest that age does not play a role in
investment fraud victimization. Rather, we believe that the positive relationship often found between age and investment fraud could be due, in part, to
older people being targeted for investment fraud more frequently than
younger people. Aging could still increase fraud victimization through
natural cognitive declines associated with the aging process—and with our
current dataset we were unable to examine this possibility. More work clearly
needs to be done in this area, but these regressions provide evidence
indicating that targeting needs to be taken into consideration to fully
understand the nuanced relationship between age and investment fraud
victimization.
While the targeting variable is the strongest predictor of investment fraud
victimization, we still need to know: how common are investment
fraud solicitations, and who tends to get targeted. Figure 10.1 shows a
histogram of the number of different types of investment fraud contacts
that respondents reported. It is evident that most respondents had been

0.27**
(0.09)
0.46*
(0.19)
0.54**
(0.17)
0.11
(0.22)
0.05
(0.20)
0.29
(0.20)
0.35*
(0.18)
0.35
(0.34)

Age (10-yr)

Risk tolerance

Too much debt

Inability to identify red ﬂags of fraud

Measured ﬁnancial literacy

Widow/widower

College educated

Presence of dependants in household

Married

Non-Asian minority

Male

Income > = $50,000

Coefﬁcient

Variable

1.42

1.42

1.34

0.95

0.89

1.72

1.58

1.31

Odds ratio

1 Demographic
variables only

TABLE . Factors associated with investment fraud victimization

0.36**
(0.10)
0.17
(0.20)
0.24
(0.18)
0.04
(0.22)
0.02
(0.21)
0.23
(0.21)
0.21
(0.18)
0.57
(0.35)
0.34**
(0.08)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.18**
(0.04)

Coefﬁcient

1.2

1.1

1.1

1.4

1.8

1.2

1.3

1

1

1.3

1.2

1.4

Odds ratio

2 Demographics and
psychographics

0.15
(0.11)
0.05
(0.21)
0.02
(0.20)
0.23
(0.24)
0.19
(0.23)
0.17
(0.22)
0.00
(0.20)
0.57
(0.38)
0.17*
(0.09)
0.07*
(0.04)
0.06
(0.04)
0.14**
(0.04)

Coefﬁcient

(continued )

1.15

1.06

1.08

1.19

1.77

1

1.18

1.21

0.8

1.02

1.05

1.16

Odds ratio

3 Demographics,
psychographics, and
solicitations

4.36
(0.56)
1,573
0.03
0.06
44.411 p < 0.0001

Coefﬁcient

Odds ratio

1 Demographic
variables only

7.42
(0.78)
1,573
0.07
0.13
106.243 p < 0.0001

Coefﬁcient

Odds ratio

2 Demographics and
psychographics

0.62**
(0.06)
6.58
(0.83)
1,573
0.14
0.28
236.941 p < 0.0001

Coefﬁcient

1.85

Odds ratio

3 Demographics,
psychographics, and
solicitations

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation’s Fraud Susceptibility Study (2013) and the 2012
National Financial Capability Study. Both the regression output and dataset are available upon request.

Notes: A logistic regression was conducted; standard errors are in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The likelihood ratio is the difference between
the log-likelihood for the constant-only and full model. Due to missing data, 148 observations were dropped from the analysis. For reference, 10
percent of survey respondents in this analysis were classiﬁed as investment fraud victims.

Observations
R-square
Max-rescaled R-square
Likelihood ratio

Intercept

Investment scam contacts

Variable

TABLE . Continued
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35%
31%

Percent (%) of respondents

27%

18%

10%
8%
4%

2%

0%
0

1

2

3

4

5

6+

Count of different types of investment frauds respondents were solicited to
participate in

Figure 10.1. Number of different fraudulent investments that survey respondents
were targeted to participate in
Note: Percentage of survey respondents by the count of different types of likely fraudulent
investment scams that they were solicited to participate in (nine different investment frauds
were examined).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation’s
Fraud Susceptibility Study (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a) and the National
Financial Capability Study (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013b). Data are available
upon request.

contacted to participate in at least one type of fraudulent investment, and
many were contacted to participate in more than one. On average, respondents were contacted for 1.77 different investment frauds.
Table 10.3 shows the results of a negative binomial regression that predicts the number of times the respondents were solicited to participate in
one of nine different likely fraudulent investments, using demographic
information easily obtained by a fraudster. This analysis focuses on the
targeting of investment fraud, so we only use variables in the model that
can be known or easily obtained. Results in Table 10.3 show that, as age
increases, the number of fraudulent solicitations a respondent received also
rises. The incidence rate ratio (IRR) for age of 1.22 indicates that, for every
ten-year increase in age, and holding other factors constant, the expected
investment fraud solicitation rate is 1.22 times higher. Stated differently, a
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TABLE . Factors associated with investment fraud targeting
Variable
Age (10-yr)
Income > = $50,000
Male
Non-Asian minority
Married
Presence of dependants in household
College educated
Widow/widower
Observations
Wald chi-square
Pseudo R-square

Incidence rate ratio

Statistical signiﬁcance

1.22
(0.03)
1.26
(0.07)
1.36
(0.07)
1.07
(0.07)
0.92
(0.06)
1.03
(0.63)
1.33
(0.07)
1.08
0.10
1,721
230.77
0.04

**
**
**

**

**

Notes: A negative binomial regression model was used to model the count data; robust standard
errors are in parentheses. (Poisson regression was not used due to overdispersion of the
dependent variable, but both models yielded similar results.) ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation’s
Fraud Susceptibility Study (2013) and the 2012 National Financial Capability Study. The
regression output and dataset are available upon request.

ten-year increase in age is associated with a 22 percent increase in the
number of investment fraud solicitations. Men are predicted to get 36
percent more investment fraud solicitations than women. Household
income is also strongly and positively related to investment fraud solicitations, as is being college-educated. We conclude that older, afﬂuent, collegeeducated males are most likely to be targeted for investment fraud, consistent
with the AARP (2011) results.

Social Inﬂuence and Investment Fraud
While some demographic groups are clearly more likely to be targeted and
become victims of investment fraud than others, anyone with access to
capital could potentially be at risk. The ubiquity of fraud solicitations,
coupled with the inability of many people to recognize the red ﬂags of
fraud, place a large number of Americans at risk of losing money to scams
(FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a). Given that ﬁnancial literacy
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appears to be positively correlated with fraud victimization, it is important to
think beyond traditional ﬁnancial education to address investment fraud
victimization. Financial decisions have also been linked to emotions (Lerner
et al. 2004); therefore, persuasion techniques that inﬂuence emotions can
also impact decision making (Kircanski et al. 2016). Combating investment
fraud thus requires an understanding of how fraudsters operate, as well as
the techniques they use to separate victims from their money.
Social inﬂuence refers to the study of how people change the thoughts,
feelings, and behavior of other people (Pratkanis 2007). The science of
social inﬂuence offers insights into better understanding and preventing
investment fraud. The Consumer Fraud Research Group analyzed 128 fulllength transcripts drawn from undercover tapes of ﬁnancial fraud pitches to
identify the inﬂuence tactics used to perpetrate economic fraud crimes and
to rank these tactics by frequency of use (see Figure 10.2). Their analysis
included the seven most common scam types found in the database of
tapes—including investment, coin, recovery room, credit card, sweepstakes,
lottery, and travel scams (Consumer Fraud Research Group 2006).
Here we focus on ﬁve of the inﬂuence tactics identiﬁed in this research as
commonly used in investment fraud. These include phantom riches (also
called phantom ﬁxation), scarcity, source credibility, social consensus, and
reciprocity. Of course, inﬂuence techniques are not only used to defraud
people: indeed, they are used in the marketing of a range of products and
services every day. When fraudsters use these tactics for ill-intent, however,
they cross an ethical line that can lead to long-lasting and potentially
devastating consequences for their victims.
Planting the seed of ‘phantom riches’ is a common technique used by
fraudsters and involves dangling the prospect of wealth by enticing a potential victim with something he wants but cannot have (Pratkanis and
Farquhar 1992). An example of phantom riches used by fraudsters is a
statement like ‘The lowest return you could possibly get on this investment
is 50 percent annually, but most investors are making upwards of 110
percent a year.’ Survey research suggests that people are attracted to this
type of statement (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a), though it
is not a responsible form of investment advertising, and returns of 50 to 100
percent per year are highly improbable.
The tactic of scarcity is applied when a salesperson creates a false sense of
urgency by claiming there is a limited supply or limited time to act, or by
claiming the opportunity is exclusive. This results in the product or service
being perceived as more valuable. Worchel et al. (1975) demonstrated the
inﬂuence of scarcity on perceived value in a simple experiment in which
they asked subjects to rate the attractiveness of cookies. The experimenters
manipulated the supply of the cookies by showing some subjects a jar with
ten cookies in it, and other subjects a jar with two cookies in it. The cookies
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Figure 10.2. Number of times identiﬁed inﬂuence tactics appeared in analysis of
fraud pitch transcripts
Note: Analysis of inﬂuence tactics found in 128 full-length transcripts drawing from a total of 650
undercover tapes of ﬁnancial fraud pitches. Seven common scam types were found in the
database of tapes—including investment, coin, recovery room, credit card, sweepstakes, lottery,
and travel scams.
Source: Consumer Fraud Research Group (2006).

were rated as more attractive when they were presented in the jar with two
cookies. West (1975) found a similar increase in the attractiveness of cafeteria food, following a decrease in the availability of the food. Examples of
how a fraudster might use scarcity include the following statements: ‘This is
an opportunity that is only available to a limited number of investors’, or
‘This offer is only good for today.’ These are examples of scarcity based on
supply and scarcity based on time, respectively.
The power of scarcity may be explained by Reactance Theory (Brehm and
Brehm 1981). Reactance occurs when an individual is motivated to react
against the impending loss of a behavior, item, or freedom. In terms of
investment fraud, if a fraudster proposes that one could lose access to an
investment by not ‘acting today’, one might react against this by wanting
the investment more than one did before. Loss aversion may be related to
scarcity as well. Loss aversion comes from Prospect Theory and posits that
losing something is psychologically more painful than gaining something
of similar value (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In terms of its use by
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fraudsters, losing the opportunity to earn a big return on an investment may
be painful enough to motivate a fraud target to go ahead with the investment, despite reservations.
Source credibility is a technique used by fraudsters that capitalizes on the
ﬁnding that people are more likely to believe others in positions of authority, and to trust organizations that they perceive as legitimate. A classic
example of the power of source credibility, although not an example of
fraud, is Stanley Milgram’s (1965, 1974) work on obedience. As is commonly
known, that study showed the ease with which a researcher donning a lab
coat and clipboard (to help establish credibility and authority) could compel study subjects to ostensibly shock confederates in another room, despite
confederates pleading for the subject to stop the shocks (of course, no
shocks were actually being administered). In fact, many subjects ‘administered’ shocks to a confederate even when they believed the confederate was
unconscious. While Milgram noted that several factors contributed to the
subjects’ willingness to shock the confederates, he argues that authority
must be established and perceived as legitimate.
Source credibility is used to build trust, and once trust is established
between the fraudster and the potential victim, it becomes easier for the
fraudster to perpetrate the fraud. Source credibility is also established by
using professional credentials, whether real or artiﬁcial. An example of
source credibility that an investment fraudster might use is a statement like
the following: ‘We are a highly regarded and proﬁtable investment management company specializing in the foreign exchange markets, futures,
options, commodities, stocks, bonds, real estate, business startup, and many
other investments.’ The appeal of this statement was tested among US adults
age 40+, and 29 percent of the respondents found the statement appealing
(FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a).
Fraudsters also use the tactic of social consensus (sometimes referred to as
social proof) whereby the more it appears that everyone else is engaging in a
particular behavior or holds a particular belief, the more likely it is that an
individual will join and agree with the group (Pratkanis 2007). Social consensus is tied to social pressure and conformity. If everyone does something,
not only must it be a good idea, but it can be difﬁcult to go against group
consensus. Solomon Asch (1956) famously demonstrated the power of the
group to engender conformity in his classic line experiment. In this experiment, he used several confederates to provide obviously wrong answers about
the length of a line on a card. The subject of the experiment, who answered
the question about the length of the line last or second-to-last, often provided
an obviously wrong answer as well, just to conform to the group.
Social consensus is often exploited by fraudsters to commit afﬁnity fraud.
This happens when a fraudster takes advantage of the trust inherent in
groups of like-minded individuals, such as those who attend the same
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place of worship or social club. The fraudster, who is or pretends to be a
member of the group, points out to potential victims that other members of
their group have already purchased a particular investment. This implies
that, if their friends and colleagues are involved, it must be a good investment. Further, among respondents to a study of investment fraud who
indicated that they had participated in a fraudulent investment, 34 percent
were introduced to the seller through a friend (FINRA Investor Education
Foundation 2013a). Social consensus can even be effective with strangers.
For example, a typical pitch from a fraudster is something like ‘This investment made hundreds of people extremely wealthy.’ With this statement, the
fraudster is relying on the potential victim thinking that hundreds of people
can’t be wrong. In fact, research has found that such a statement is appealing to 30 percent of the respondents who rated it (FINRA Investor
Education Foundation 2013a).
The norm of reciprocity is another technique that fraudsters rely on to
convince potential victims to part with their money (Gouldner 1960). The
norm is based on the notion that people should return help to those who
help them, and the norm is found to be powerful and universal. The power
of reciprocity has been demonstrated in a number of different settings,
including charities (Cialdini 2001) and organizational/industrial settings
(Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002). Given the effectiveness of reciprocity, it is
not surprising that fraudsters use the technique. An example would be a
fraudster giving you a ‘break on his commission’. Similarly, free meal
seminars are another common tactic that relies on the norm of reciprocity.
A meal is provided, after which the fraudster expects that attendees will
invest in his scheme in return for the meal. Not all free meal seminars are
frauds, but a report by the Securities Exchange Commission, the North
American Securities Administrators Association, and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority found that, in half the cases they examined, the sales
materials contained claims that were exaggerated, misleading, or otherwise
unwarranted (Securities and Exchange Commission et al. 2007). Moreover,
13 percent of the seminars appeared to involve fraud, ranging from
unfounded projections of returns to sales of ﬁctitious products. While little
empirical work has been done on the efﬁcacy of free meal seminars, their
ubiquity lends credence to their effectiveness: 64 percent of adults indicated
that they were contacted to attend a free lunch sales pitch (FINRA Investor
Education Foundation 2013a).
By its very nature, investing typically involves taking on some degree of
risk, ranging from the risk of returns failing to keep pace with inﬂation, to
the risk of incurring losses on investments, or even losing one’s entire
investment. Whether applied individually or collectively, these and similar
tactics can greatly, and often subconsciously, impact the psychological and
emotional state of the intended fraud target, which can affect perceptions of
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risk and lead to compromised decision making. For example, according to
the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, emotional reactions to risky situations often
drive behavior (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Newly emerging research has also
found that inducing either a positive or a negative emotional state in older
adults increased their intention to purchase items marketed with misleading
advertisements (Kircanski et al. 2016). In short, social inﬂuence tactics may
be effective because they can change a person’s emotional state and, consequently, affect their willingness to take on risk and their ability to make
sound decisions.

Combating Investment Fraud
Early campaigns to prevent investment fraud focused on warning investors
about some perils associated with investing. One unintended consequence
of warning campaigns, however, is that they may inspire fear in the target
audience. And while fear has been identiﬁed as a powerful motivator—as
explained in the examples of the scarcity tactic—it is thought to be largely
ineffective in behavior change campaigns ( Job 1988).
In recent years, investment fraud prevention campaigns have become
more sophisticated and incorporate the knowledge and understanding of
social inﬂuence tactics in an effort to empower consumers to spot and avoid
fraud. As discussed earlier in this chapter, emerging research on social
inﬂuence techniques employed by con criminals has revealed speciﬁc tactics
that are used to harness emotion and ultimately inﬂuence their targets’
ﬁnancial decisions. Given this, some campaigns have shifted from warning
investors about speciﬁc scams to educating investors about their vulnerability, the various social inﬂuence tactics that fraudsters use, and the types
of resources they may use for vetting both sellers and products prior to
investing.
This shift aligns with recommendations outlined in an Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development review of anti-scam consumer
behavior change campaigns (OECD 2005). The study concluded that a ‘lack
of data about the impact of anti-scam campaigns makes it difﬁcult to be
conclusive about the value of the campaigns that have been run to date’.6
For this reason, the OECD examined a series of social marketing campaigns
that did provide evidence of effectiveness. Through this analysis, the OECD
concluded that successful campaigns must identify a clear target market; try
to change behavior by specifying speciﬁc strategies and steps; use an authoritative tone; identify and communicate consumer beneﬁts; tell stories; and
engage partners. While information campaigns and targeted warnings have
some utility, the OECD hypothesized that their value was limited by the
reactive, speciﬁc, short-term nature of the prevention approach. They
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suggested that a more strategic, long-term, skills-based approach to tackling
scams was required.
To combat investment fraud, organizations such as AARP, the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), and the FINRA Investor Education Foundation have
engaged in efforts that not only increase investor awareness of possibly
fraudulent activities but also look to the science of social inﬂuence and
the promise of social marketing to empower investors to resist fraud. The
investor protection strategy of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation,
for example, is built upon three key pillars: investors need to know that they
are vulnerable; investors need to learn to recognize the red ﬂags of fraud;
and investors need to take simple protective steps, including asking questions and independently verifying answers.
Fraud prevention campaigns, like many other consumer protection campaigns, ultimately seek to change the behavior of consumers such that they
may identify a scam prior to falling victim. Behavior change is rarely a
discrete, single event (Zimmerman et al. 2000). An individual usually
moves from being uninterested or ambivalent (the pre-contemplation
stage), to considering a change (contemplation stage), to deciding and
preparing to make a change. This can lead to the desired action stage, but
often some type of maintenance and relapse prevention program is required
to sustain the impetus to change (Zimmerman et al. 2000). Most individuals
ﬁnd themselves cycling through the various stages before the behavior
change is ingrained.
During the pre-contemplation stage, in particular, many people may not
see that advice on how to avoid investment fraud applies to them: that is,
they have the illusion of invulnerability. This illusion poses a hurdle for
investor protection efforts; consumers who do not believe the information
applies to them are less likely to advance to the next stage, contemplation.
Though some demographic groups are more likely to be victims of investment fraud, nearly everyone is at risk. If a person has money, he or she will
likely come across someone who will try to coax him or her to ‘get in on the
ground ﬂoor of a great investment’ or ‘strike while the iron is hot’. In fact,
one study found that over eight out of ten US adults age 40+ had been
contacted in some fashion to participate in a likely fraudulent activity
(FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013a). Thus, campaigns that
address the illusion of invulnerability and help investors recognize that
they—like others—are at risk of falling victim to a scam may be more likely
to succeed in moving investors to take action to prevent it.
Identifying the red ﬂags of fraud is, not surprisingly, tightly linked with
understanding the social inﬂuence tactics used by fraudsters. Accordingly,
efforts to build the investors’ skills to identify the questionable use of
persuasion and inﬂuence have been undertaken. Inﬂuence techniques
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identiﬁed through social inﬂuence research in the context of ﬁnancial
fraud—including phantom riches, scarcity, source credibility, social consensus, and reciprocity (Consumer Fraud Research Group 2006)—are powerful
in building emotion and convincing people to act without evaluating the
risks of these actions. Teaching an investor to recognize these tactics is
intended to heighten awareness of the emotional impact of the techniques,
and consequently, to limit the impact of the techniques on ﬁnancial decision making. In other words, by learning to recognize when decision making
is clouded by emotion, investors may be better equipped to make less
emotional, more cognitive decisions.
Beyond recognizing vulnerability and learning to spot persuasion, investors are encouraged to take speciﬁc proactive steps to protect themselves.
One suggested step involves encouraging people to reduce their exposure
to pitches. Some behaviors associated with fraud risk include openness to
information and buying investments recommended by a friend, relative, coworker, or neighbor (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2007). As
noted earlier in this chapter, targeting is highly predictive of investment
fraud victimization. In reducing their exposure to pitches, investors may
limit the number of fraud attempts to which they are exposed. Fraud
prevention efforts also encourage investors to closely examine the background of those trying to sell them investments, and the legitimacy of the
investments themselves. This step can assist investors in verifying whether
the tactic of source credibility is being used in a deceptive manner.
A legitimate securities salesperson must be properly licensed, and his or
her ﬁrm must be registered with FINRA, the SEC, or a state securities
regulator (depending on the type of business the ﬁrm conducts). FINRA’s
BrokerCheck provides information for investors checking the background
of broker-dealers, and the SEC’s Investment Advisor Public Disclosure
(IAPD) database provides information on the background of investment
advisors. The CFTC offers SmartCheck to help investors check backgrounds,
as well. And each state has resources for helping investors research the
background of investment professionals. The North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) is a one place to start to learn about
state-level investment fraud prevention efforts.
Regulators also recommend that investors check to be sure the investment that he or she is being sold is properly registered with the
SEC. Although not all investments are required to be registered, most
investments are—and if they are registered they can be found in the SEC’s
EDGAR Database. Investors should be cautioned that there is an additional
level of risk to investing in investments that are not registered with the SEC.
Evidence on the effectiveness of the fraud prevention education initiatives
described above is limited and is difﬁcult to obtain. The FINRA Investor
Education Foundation and AARP conducted two rounds of ﬁeld tests in an
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attempt to examine the effectiveness of a ninety-minute investor protection
program. Outsmarting Investment Fraud (OIF), a program developed by the
FINRA Investor Education Foundation and AARP to help investors resist
fraud, was tested in a quasi-experimental fashion. The OIF program emphasizes the skills-building, investor protection strategy noted earlier in this
chapter—accepting vulnerability, recognizing red ﬂags, and taking simple
steps prior to investing. Individuals who attended the OIF workshop were
contacted three days later by a telemarketer who had experience with highpressure sales, and the telemarketer asked if he could send the individual
information about an oil and gas investment (oil and gas investments are
often rife with fraud). To serve as a control group, the telemarketer also
randomly contacted individuals who were registered to attend the OIF
program the following week but had not yet been exposed to the program.
The results showed that individuals who received the OIF training were
signiﬁcantly less likely to respond to a fraud appeal than individuals who
had not received the training. Thirty-six percent of the control group agreed
to send the telemarketer their contact information compared to 18 percent
of the group that took the training—a signiﬁcant improvement in resistance
to high-pressure investment sales (Shadel et al. 2010). In short, the ﬁeld test
demonstrated that the OIF program—and the investor protection strategy
on which it is developed—may change behavior and help protect investors
from fraud.
Outbound call centers have also been used to proactively contact people
who might be at risk of lottery fraud and offer counseling to help the
potential victim avoid victimization. A study conducted by AARP and the
US Department of Justice (AARP 2003) found that the call centers were
effective at reducing responsiveness to fraudulent pitches, and a follow-up
ﬁeld study conducted by Stanford University found similar results (Scheibe
et al. 2014). Yet, neither of these studies focused speciﬁcally on investment
fraud, so it is unclear if this approach would generalize to helping protect
investors from investment fraud.

Conclusions
Our review of the literature suggests that investment fraud is a signiﬁcant
problem in America. It is also a problem that may become worse as the Baby
Boomers retire and signiﬁcant assets move out of their employer-provided
retirement plans. While several demographic characteristics are associated
with fraud victims (e.g., age, sex, and income), it is unclear whether certain
demographic groups are more susceptible to investment fraud, more targeted by fraudsters, or both. Further, psychographic variables like risk
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tolerance, ﬁnancial literacy, and the inability to identify the red ﬂags of
fraud are also associated with investment fraud victimization.
The science of social inﬂuence, which refers to how people change the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others through a variety of methods, has
been used to help explain how fraudsters con their victims. Phantom riches,
source credibility, social consensus, reciprocity, and scarcity are all among
the social inﬂuence tactics commonly used by fraudsters, and their effectiveness at inﬂuencing behavior is supported by survey-based ﬁnancial fraud
research and experimental social psychological research. Educational initiatives aimed at getting people to understand the social inﬂuence tactics
fraudsters use have been effective in increasing the ability of individuals to
resist fraud pitches.
Given that the goal of many of the social inﬂuence tactics is to make
potential fraud victims emotional, and that emotions have been tied to
compromised ﬁnancial decision making, one way to reduce the likelihood
of falling victim to investment fraud is to wait a period, such as 24 hours, after
being approached with an investment before making any investment decisions. This will enable potential victims’ emotions to subside and give them
the opportunity to discuss the possible investment with friends and family.
Additional recommendations include checking the background of the person trying to sell you the investment and checking to see if the investment is a
registered investment. Nevertheless, more work needs to be done to understand if these educational initiatives and fraud prevention strategies are
robust across fraud types. In addition, policymakers and stakeholders may
need to build a broader network of organizations to assist fraud victims—in
part due to the high level of re-victimization (Hume and Canan 2016). For
example, organizations such as the National Center for Victims of Crime are
beginning to offer training to staff of adult protective services agencies,
senior support groups, and other community-based consumer protection
organizations, to build their capacity to assist fraud victims.
Research aimed at understanding the causes and consequences of fraud is
in its early stages, so gaps in our knowledge exist. For instance, Deevy et al.
(2012) posit a number of questions on a variety of topics that need to be
addressed, including more accurately measuring the prevalence and costs of
ﬁnancial fraud, improving the reporting of ﬁnancial fraud, assessing susceptibility to fraud, and identifying the motivations of fraudsters, to name a few.
Since this list of research questions has been published, progress has already
been made on more accurately measuring the prevalence and costs of fraud.
A collaborative effort of the US Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice
Statistics, the Stanford Center on Longevity, and the FINRA Investor Education Foundation is trying to more accurately categorize and measure
ﬁnancial fraud. Working in coordination with other organizations and
researchers, they have created a taxonomy of fraud that can be used to
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categorize the many different types of ﬁnancial frauds including investment
fraud (Beals et al. 2015). The goal of the project is to include a survey as a
supplement to the Department of Justice’s National Crime Victimization
Survey, which would provide researchers, policymakers, and stakeholders
with accurate baseline prevalence estimates of the various types of ﬁnancial
fraud and, potentially, an improved understanding of ﬁnancial fraud. In
addition, inclusion of fraud victimization questions in an upcoming wave of
the Health and Retirement Study will provide researchers with a rich longitudinal data source to better understand the prevalence and predictors of
ﬁnancial fraud. The increased attention that these projects and others like
them bring to the problem of investment fraud—and to ﬁnancial fraud,
more generally—offers promise that in the coming years researchers and
policymakers will have a better understanding of investment fraud and
effective interventions for protecting investors.

Appendix
This Appendix contains information on the variables included in the regression analyses that are reported in Table 10.2 and Table 10.3.

Dependent Variable
Respondents were shown nine descriptions of ﬁnancial offers, all of which
are known to be rife with fraud, but which were not identiﬁed as fraudulent
in the descriptions—for example, lottery scams, oil and gas scams, and freemeal ﬁnancial seminars. For each of these potentially fraudulent offers,
respondents were asked whether they had ever been solicited with such an
offer, whether they had engaged with the offer (e.g., made an investment or
responded to the solicitor), and whether they had lost a signiﬁcant amount
of money after investing in the offer. Respondents who said they lost a
signiﬁcant amount of money investing in at least one of the nine offers
were coded with a 1 to indicate they lost money in a potentially fraudulent
activity; all other respondents were coded with a 0.

Demographic Independent Variables
The regressions included the following demographic variables.
(1) Age—measured continuously
(2) Household income—greater than or equal to $50,000 = 1 otherwise 0

Understanding and Combating Investment Fraud 207

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Sex—male = 1 and female = 0
Education—college degree or higher = 1 otherwise 0
Marital status—married = 1 otherwise 0
Non-Asian minority—white and Asian = 0 otherwise 1
Presence of dependants in the household—dependants present = 1
otherwise 0
(8) College educated—college degree or higher = 1 otherwise 0
(9) Widow—widow = 1 otherwise 0

Psychographic Independent Variables
The regressions included the following psychographic variables.
(1) Financial literacy—measured using a ﬁve-question ﬁnancial literacy
quiz of questions covering fundamental concepts of economics and
ﬁnance that may be encountered in everyday life, such as calculations
involving interest rates and inﬂation, principles relating to risk and
diversiﬁcation, the relationship between bond prices and interest
rates, and the impact that a shorter term can have on total interest
rate payments over the life of the loan.
(2) Risk tolerance—measured by asking respondents how willing they
are to take investment risk (1 equals not at all willing and 10 equals
very willing).
(3) Inability to identify common red ﬂags of investment fraud—
measured using a ten-point scale where 1 indicated that the respondent had no interest in a typically fraudulent advertising statement and
10 indicated extreme interest (the mean of six ‘red ﬂag’ advertising
statements was used in the regression).
(4) Perception of debt—measured using a seven-point scale where 1
indicated that they strongly disagreed with the statement ‘I have
too much debt right now’ and 7 indicated that they strongly agreed
with this statement.

Targeting Variable
The regression included a variable that quantiﬁed the number of different
investment frauds that the respondent was targeted for. Targeting was
measured in the same manner that victimization was measured—that is, by
showing respondents nine descriptions of ﬁnancial offers which are known
to be rife with fraud. For each of these potentially fraudulent offers,
respondents were asked whether they had ever received such an offer.
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Respondents who said they did—regardless of whether or not they
responded to the offer or participated in the solicited investment—were
coded with a 1 to indicate they were solicited for the particular type of fraud
being assessed, and 0 otherwise. The nine variables, one for each type of
fraud, were then summed and the measure of fraud solicitation could range
from 0 (never being solicited) to 9 (being solicited for all nine forms of
investment fraud examined).

Notes
1. This chapter focuses on investment fraud, though much of the extant research
examines more general ﬁnancial fraud. Complicating the issue further, some
researchers conﬂate the terms consumer fraud, personal fraud, telemarketing
fraud, or fraud—often without providing explicit deﬁnitions. Research studies
cited in this chapter cover all areas of fraud, but an attempt is made to focus on
investment fraud. Further, when describing the results of a study, we typically used
the same terminology that the authors use.
2. Financial elder abuse and elder ﬁnancial exploitation are general terms that
include the ﬁnancial targeting of older people, often by someone in a position
of trust. This chapter focuses on ﬁnancial scams targeting all Americans, including the elderly, but does not focus speciﬁcally on older people or on different
types of abuse by someone in a position of trust. See DeLiema and Deevy
(Chapter 9, this volume) for more information on ﬁnancial elder abuse.
3. Unlike marginal probabilities, odds ratios are invariant to the values of the
independent variables (Liao 1994).
4. Survey respondents were asked if they were contacted to participate in or lost
money in the following types of investment frauds: Cold Call Scam, Free Lunch
Seminar, Oil & Gas Scam, Promissory Note Scam, Pump & Dump, Pre-IPO Scam,
High-Yield Investment Program Scam, Multi-Level Marketing, and Digital Currency Purchase. For more information on the methodology used to collect these
data, see FINRA Investor Education Foundation (2013a).
5. The results of these analyses are promising, but they suffer from two limitations.
First, the survey methodology assumes that, in order to be victimized by investment fraud, the respondent had to be targeted or solicited to participate in a
potentially fraudulent investment. As a result, respondents who said they were not
contacted for fraud were not asked if they were ever victimized by fraud. Yet, it is
possible that victims actually sought out interaction with the person who ultimately defrauded them. Second, the survey questions asked if respondents had ever
been victimized by different types of investment fraud, so older respondents
could have been targeted and victimized by investment fraud more often than
younger respondents, simply because they had more time to be targeted and
victimized. Nevertheless, research on memory decay suggests that respondents
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cannot think back too far when recalling events, which may lessen the impact of
this limitation (Jenkins et al. 2002).
6. The lack of evaluative reports might be attributed to the scarcity of time and
resources for many of the campaigners, who likely have to focus on their other
program activities instead of extensive evaluation. They may also lack the research
expertise to conduct evaluations. Further, while academia has a high demand for
publishing results, most non-proﬁts have little incentive for making public any
evaluations which they do complete. Notable exceptions came from evaluations of
publicly funded programs, academic case studies, and professional associations
working to improve best practices.
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